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CLASSIFICATION OF PROPERTY




The Uniform Marital Property Act (UMPA) was approved
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws in 1983' and has been enacted, with some changes, in Wis-
consin.2 The Act is, in effect, a uniform community property
statute that could be adopted in community property or com-
mon-law states. Although the familiar terms "community,"
"community property," and "separate property" are not used in
the Act, it is the opinion of both this writer and other commen-
tators that the UMPA is a community property statute.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School; B.A., 1967; M.A.,
1968; J.D., 1973, University of Illinois.
1. UNIF. MARITAL PROP. ACT (1983), 9A U.L.A. 21 (Supp. 1986) was approved at the
Annual Conference of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Boca Raton, Florida,
July 22-29, 1983. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNI-
FORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING IN ITS NINETY-
SECOND YEAR 60 (1983).
2. The Act was adopted in Wisconsin by Act of April 4, 1984, § 47, 1984 Wis. LAWS
186. As of this writing, the Act is under consideration in several other states. The Wis-
consin version differs from the official version in several important respects, some of
which will be discussed in this article.
3. K. CHRISTIANSEN, F. WM. HABERMAN, J. HAYDON, D. KINNAMON, M. McGARITY & M.
WILCOX, MARITAL PROPERTY LAW IN WISCONSIN 1-4 (1984) [hereinafter cited as MARITAL
PROPERTY LAW IN WISCONSIN]; Kornfeld, UMPA: The Uniform Marital Property Act, 4
EQUITABLE DIsTRIB. REP. 67, 70 (1983); Reppy, The Uniform Marital Property Act: Some
Suggested Revisions for a Basically Sound Act, 21 Hous. L. REv. 679, 689 (1984); Taylor,
Wisconsin's Uniform Marital Property Act: Community Property Moves East, 12 CoM-
MUNITY PROP. J. 83, 84 (1985); Weisberger, The Wisconsin Marital Property Act: High-
lights of the Wisconsin Experience in Developing a Model for Comprehensive Common
Law Property Reform, 1 WIS. WOMEN's I.J. 5, 23 (1985).
Professor Reppy has argued that the familiar terms "community" and "separate"
should have been used rather than the analogous terms "marital" and "individual."
Reppy, supra, at 682-83, 688-89. Whether or not the UMPA is a community property
statute is of more than academic interest. I.R.C. § 1014 (b)(6) (1985) provides that if a
decedent and surviving spouse held community property at the time of the decedent's
death and if at least one-half of the community interest was includible in determining
1
Furth: Classification of Property under the Uniform Marital Property Act
Published by Scholar Commons, 1986
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
The prefatory note to the UMPA acknowledges the Act's in-
debtedness to the community property system:
Some of the root concepts [of the UMPA] can be traced to
the sharing ideal which is at the center of the historical com-
munity property approach. The fundamental principle that
ownership of all of the economic rewards from the personal ef-
fort of each spouse during marriage is shared by the spouses in
vested, present, and equal interests is the heart of the commu-
nity property system. It is also the heart of the Uniform Mari-
tal Property Act.
4
The terms "marital property" and "individual property," used
in the UMPA, are analogous to the terms "community property"
and "separate property" in the statutes and cases of the commu-
nity property jurisdictions. It is important to note, however, that
these terms are analogous, not synonomous.
The status of the UMPA as a community property statute is
open to some dispute. In fact, language in the prefatory note to
the Act itself suggests a different conclusion:
[The UMPA] translates the emotional and perceived con-
cept of "ours" into a verified legal reality. And while that par-
allels sharing under community property systems, the Act is
more accurately characterized as a sui generis approach, and as
one which utilizes equally useful ideas developed in common
law jurisdictions, such as title based management and control.
... Though drafted with an awareness of various community
property statutes and cases, the Uniform Marital Property Act
is not an image of any of them, [sic]'
As is well known, there is no uniformity among the community
the value of the decedent's gross estate, the surviving spouse's share shall be considered
to have been acquired or to have passed from the decedent. Under IRC § 1014(a)(1)
(1985), the tax basis of the surviving spouse's share will be the fair market value of the
property at the date of the decedent's death. See also I.R.C. §§ 66, 879, 2039(c) (1985).
"Community property" is not defined in the Internal Revenue Code, but it is obviously
important that the UMPA's status as a community property statute be clear.
Use of the term "marital property" may cause confusion in an adopting state. Di-
vorce statutes sometimes refer to the property that is subject to division as "marital
property." See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 503 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 403.190 (Baldwin 1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 518.54, .58 (West 1985). Such
marital property is not the same as "marital property" under the UMPA.
4. UNIF. MARITAL PROP. AcT prefatory note (1983), 9A U.L.A. at 24 (Supp. 1986).
5. Id. at 25.
[Vol. 37
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property states. The UMPA drafting committee not only bor-
rowed various concepts from several of those states, but also de-
veloped some new concepts. The mere fact, however, that the
authors of the UMPA stated that they used some common-law
concepts in drafting the Act' and that it is not an image of any
particular community property statute does not mean that it is
not a community property act. For example, the drafters had to
select some system to determine the management and control of
community property, and they happened to choose a title based
system.1 Joint or equal management of property is, after all, a
comparatively recent development in community property
states.8 A proper analysis of whether the UMPA is a community
property statute should compare the central principles of both
concepts, rather than focus on one particular detail derived from
common-law property systems.
One authority has provided the following explanation of the
community property system:
At the foundation of [the concept of community property] is
the principle that all wealth acquired by the joint efforts of the
husband and wife shall be common property; the theory of the
law being that, with respect to marital property acquisitions,
the marriage is a community of which each spouse is a mem-
ber, equally contributing by his or her industry to its prosper-
ity, and possessing an equal right to succeed to the property
9
The UMPA fits this description precisely10 and should, there-
6. Common-law concepts have been introduced into American community property
law from early times. See W. MCCLANAHAN, COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES § 9:3, at 436-38 (1982).
7. UNIF. MARITAL PROP. ACT § 5 (1983) provides that a spouse acting alone may
"manage and control," that is transfer, mortgage, etc., marital property held in that
spouse's name alone.
8. W. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 6, § 9:9-12, at 452-67. Professor Reppy has observed
that "the concept that management power should follow title, while foreign to the earli-
est American community property regimes, appeared in the Texas community property
reform of 1967, the New Mexico reform of 1973, and the Louisiana reform of 1980, as
well as in California statutes first enacted in 1925." Reppy, supra note 3, at 683-84 (foot-
notes omitted).
9. W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPALS OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 1, at 2-3 (2d
ed. 1971).
10. The Wisconsin version of the Act has been amended to further clarify this issue.
Under the amendment, § 766.001(2) was added, which provides: "It is the intent of the
legislature that marital property is a form of community property." Act of October 22,
1986]
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fore, be classified as a community property act. That conclusion
is the premise for this article, which relies extensively upon com-
munity property case law and commentary.
II. OVERVMW
The classification of property is the first step in any applica-
tion of the UMPA. The Act classifies all property acquired after
the "determination date" as either "marital property" or "indi-
vidual property," unless the property is the proceeds of property
owned before the determination date." "Determination date" is
defined as the last to occur of (1) marriage, (2) 12:01 a.m. on the
date of the establishment of a marital domicile in the state, or
(3) 12:01 a.m. on the effective date of the Act.12 The legal effects
of the Act flow from this classification. Although the terms
"marital" and "individual" are never explicitly defined,' 3 a read-
ing of the entire Act provides a fairly comprehensive indication
of what these two classes are and how they differ. For example,
"Each spouse has a present undivided one-half interest in mari-
tal property,"' 4 regardless of which spouse holds "title" to the
property in the traditional common-law sense. The ability of the
titled spouse to deal with the property is determined under the
management and control rules.' 5
The Act also deals with a third type of property-that
which was owned before the determination date. The drafters
made a conscious decision not to alter the classification or own-
ership rights of this property, subject to certain exceptions. 6 As
the Prefatory Note to the UMPA points out,
[This treatment] represents a deferred approach to reclassifica-
tion of the property of spouses which does not otherwise have
1985, § 68, 1985 Wis. LAWS 37.
11. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
12. UNIF. MARITAL PROP. AcT § 1(5) (1983). The effective date in Wisconsin was Jan-
uary 1, 1986. Act of April 4, 1984, § 93, 1984 Wis. LAWS 186.
13. De Funiak and Vaughn wrote that the early Spanish community property stat-
utes defined community property as all property acquired during marriage, with certain
exceptions. W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 9, § 58, at 114-15. Since the UMPA
follows the same pattern, it defines "marital property" in the same way, at least in De
Funiak's terms. See infra text accompanying notes 20-27.
14. UNIF. MARITAL PROP. AcT § 4(c) (1983).
15. Id. § 5.
16. Id. § 4(h).
454 [Vol. 37
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the characteristics of marital property due to the time or place
of its acquisition. The deferral is to the time of marital termi-
nation at divorce or death .... A provision effecting auto-
matic reclassification of such property with the passage of the
Act would amount to retroactive legislation and would risk
constitutional attack.'
7
The Act contains two indirect exceptions to the rule that
property owned prior to the determination date remains un-
changed. First, if such property becomes mixed with marital
property and the nonmarital component cannot be traced, the
property will be reclassified as marital property.'8 Second, prop-
erty that would have been marital property if acquired after the
determination date will be treated as if it were marital property
upon termination of the marriage by death or dissolution.'
A. Marital Property
Section 4 of the UMPA sets forth the general rules of classi-
fication. The first two subsections are central to the classifica-
tion system. They provide:
(a) All property of spouses is marital property except that
which is classified otherwise by this chapter.
(b) All property of spouses is presumed to be marital
property.2 0
17. Id. prefatory note, 9A U.L.A. at 24 (Supp. 1986). See also Furrh, Is the Marital
Property Act Retroactive?, 57 Wis. B. BuuJ. 15 (July 1984); Irish, A Common Law State
Considers a Shift to Community Property, 5 COMMUNITY PROP. J. 227, 242 (1978).
18. UNIF. MARITAL PROP. AcT § 14(a) (1983). The provision is not retroactive because
the mixing will occur after the determination date. Thus, reclassification can be avoided
by preventing mixing or by drafting an agreement between the spouses. "Mixing" under
the UMPA is the equivalent of "commingling" in the community property states. See id.
§ 14 comment, 9A U.L.A. at 44 (Supp. 1986).
19. Id. §§ 17, 18. An interesting question was presented in Wisconsin by the appar-
ent inconsistency between § 17(a) and Wis. STAT. § 767.255 (1981), which governs the
division of property upon divorce. Under § 767.255, all property owned by spouses at
divorce, other than that acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance, is presumed to
be divided equally. That property may differ, however, from property that is or would
have been "marital property" under the UMPA, since the exceptions contained in §
767.255 are not identical to the exceptions to classification as marital property under the
UMPA. Wis. STAT. § 766.75(1) (1981-82), which corresponds to UMPA § 17(1), has,
therefore, been repealed. Act of October 22, 1985, § 141, 1985 WIs. LAWS 37.
20. UNIF. MARITAL PROP. ACT § 1(14) (1983) provides: "'Presumption' or a 'pre-
sumed fact' means the imposition on the person against whom the presumption or pre-
sumed fact is directed of the burden of proving that the nonexistence of the presumed
1986]
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Thus, ambiguities in classification are likely to be resolved in
favor of classification as marital property.
Although perhaps unnecessary in light of the subsections
quoted above, the statute is specific in classifying income of a
spouse as marital property. All income earned or accrued by a
spouse and all income attributable to property of a spouse dur-
ing marriage and after the determination date is marital prop-
erty.21 Thus, the "income rule" of the UMPA follows the minor-
ity view among community property states that income
produced by nonmarital property during marriage is marital
property.2 2 The Act also includes specific provisions classifying
certain life insurance policies and proceeds 23 and "deferred em-
ployment benefits, 24 a discussion of which is beyond the scope
of this article.
B. Individual Property
All property of spouses is marital property unless it is clas-
sified otherwise by the Act. The two classes of property that are
not marital consist of property acquired before the determina-
tion date25 and "individual property." Section 4(g) of the UMPA
condition or fact is more probable than its existence."
21. Id. § 4(d). This concept has already been recognized by Wisconsin opinions con-
struing Wis. STAT. § 767.255 (1983-84), which provides for the division of property upon
divorce. See, e.g., Arneson v. Arneson, 120 Wis. 2d 236, 244-45, 355 N.W.2d 16, 20 (Ct.
App. 1984).
22. Idaho, Louisiana, and Texas follow the "Spanish rule" that "rents, issues and
profits of separate property" are community property. W. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 6, §
6:12, at 344-46. Arizona, California, Nevada, New Mexico, and Washington follow the
"California rule" that "rents, issues and profits of separate property are . . . also sepa-
rate property." Id. § 6:13, at 346. The drafters of the UMPA probably believed it was
necessary to state the income rule with specificity since it is a minority position.
The Wisconsin version of the Act in effect provides an option for a spouse. Section
766.59 states: "A spouse may unilaterally execute a written statement which classifies the
income attributable to all or certain of that spouse's property other than marital prop-
erty as individual property." The spouse must provide notice of this election to the other
spouse. Act of October 22, 1985, § 122r, 1985 Wis. LAWS 37. This provision, in effect, will
allow a spouse to choose between the "Spanish rule" and the "California rule" for all or
some of that spouse's property. The rule is based on a Louisiana statute that requires
filing for registry rather than for notice to the other spouse. LA. Civ. ConE ANN. art. 2339
(West 1985).
23. UNIF. MARrrAL PROP. AcT § 12 (1983).
24. Id. § 13.
25. The Act specifically provides that it does not alter the classification and owner-
ship rights of such property except as otherwise provided in the Act. Id. § 4(h). One of
6
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provides that property acquired by a spouse during marriage
and after the determination date is individual property if it is
acquired in one of the following ways:
(1) By gift or a disposition at death by a third person to
that spouse and not to both spouses;
(2) In exchange for or with the proceeds of other individ-
ual property of the spouse;
(3) From appreciation of that spouse's individual property,
except to the extent it is classified as marital under § 14;
(4) By a decree;
(5) By a marital property agreement;
(6) By a written consent;
(7) As a recovery for damage to the spouse's present undi-
vided 50 percent interest in marital property, resulting from
breach by the other spouse of his or her duty of good faith;
26
(8) As a recovery for personal injury, with certain
exceptions.
2 7
Section 7 provides that spouses may reclassify their prop-
erty by gift, from one spouse to the other, or by marital property
agreement. While marital property agreements must satisfy cer-
tain requirements,28 property may be reclassified by gift without
the exceptions provides that property owned by a spouse at death or divorce "which
would have been marital property... if acquired after the determination date must be
treated as if it were marital property." Id. §§ 17(1), 18(a). Other exceptions include the
treatment of income from such property as marital, as discussed supra notes 21-22 and
accompanying text, and the reclassification of such property as marital because of mixing
under id. § 14(a). See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
26. Section § 4(g)(5) establishes that such a recovery would be individual property,
but refers to § 15(a), "Interspousal Remedies," for an explanation of what the recovery
would be for. Section 15(a), in turn, refers to the good faith duty between spouses in
matters involving marital property or other property of the other spouse, which is im-
posed by § 2.
27. The amount of the recovery attributable to expenses paid or otherwise satisfied
from marital property will be marital property. Id. § 4(g)(6). The Wisconsin act provides
that the amount of recovery attributable to loss of income during marriage will also be
marital property. Wis. STAT. § 766.31(7)(f) (1983-84). It is an interesting question
whether it will be necessary, under that provision, to distinguish between future lost
income and pain and suffering in judgments and settlement agreements.
28. If the spouse against whom enforcement of a marital property agreement is
sought proves that he or she was not provided a fair and reasonable disclosure of the
property and liabilities of the other spouse, the agreement is not enforceable unless that
spouse waived such disclosure or had actual notice of the property and liabilities of the
other spouse. UNIF. MA.TrrAL PRop. AcT § 10(f)-(g) (1983).
It is not clear precisely what is and what is not a marital property agreement. Sec-
tion 10(a) requires that a marital property agreement be "a document signed by both
7
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any formalities beyond the usual requirements of intent, deliv-
ery, and acceptance. It is likely, therefore, that spouses will
choose to use gifts, where appropriate, as an easy and inexpen-
sive way to reclassify their marital property as individual
property.
29
The Act contains one additional provision under which indi-
vidual property may be created. Section 6(a) limits to $500 the
value of gifts that a spouse acting alone may make to a third
person during a calendar year, unless the amount of the gift,
when made, is reasonable in light of the economic position of the
parties.30 Section 6(b) provides that if those limitations are ex-
ceeded, the other spouse may bring an action to recover the
property or a compensatory judgment to the extent of the non-
compliance "unless both spouses act together in making the
gift. 3 1 If the recovery occurs after dissolution of the marriage or
spouses." It is uncertain, however, whether all documents signed by both spouses, or
only some limited number of them, are or may be marital property agreements. The
Wisconsin version has been amended to provide that only spouses may be parties to
marital property agreements. Act of October 22, 1985, § 112, 1985 Wis. LAWS 37. The
amendment is intended to eliminate a possible argument that such documents as bank
deposit agreements or consumer contracts signed by both spouses and a third party are
marital property agreements. See id. § 112 note.
29. Since income attributable to property of a spouse is marital property under §
4(d), income attributable to property given by one spouse to the other will also be mari-
tal. This rule has been changed in the Wisconsin version by the 1985 amendments. Sec-
tion 766.31(10) now provides: "If a spouse gives property to the other spouse and intends
at the time the gift is made that the property be the individual property of the donee
spouse, the income from the property is the individual property of the donee spouse
unless a contrary intent of the donor. . . is established." Act of October 22, 1985, § 83,
1985 Wis. LAWS 37. Under the rule of § 4, spouses who want to make a complete gift,
including future income, will be required either to enter into a marital property agree-
ment pursuant to § 10 that classifies future income as individual or to make periodic
gifts of the income. The Wisconsin amendment eliminates this complexity, is probably
consistent with the intent of most individuals who give property to their spouses, and
allows the donor the flexibility of choosing the classification of the future income.
30. The $500 amount is bracketed in the UMPA, which recognizes that states may
wish to choose a different amount. The Wisconsin version has been increased to $1000.
Act of October 22, 1985, § 88, 1985 Wis. LAws 37.
31. UNIP. MARrrAL PROP. ACr § 6(b) (1983). The meaning of the phrase "act to-
gether" is unclear. It certainly cannot mean "act simultaneously," since that would usu-
ally be impossible. Does it mean "within a limited span of time"? Does it include later
acquiescence in the gift? Would the later signing of a gift tax return by the other spouse
constitute "acting together"? If so, did the gift occur at the time of the signing of the
return, or does it relate back to the original act of donation?
It would appear that the gift is complete upon delivery by the donor spouse with
intent to give and acceptance by the donee. Section 6(b) merely creates a right of recov-
8
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after the death of either spouse, it is limited to one-half of the
value of the gift and is individual property.2
III. THE CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM IN DETAIL
The two most important factors in classifying property are
the source of the property and the time of its acquisition.
33
A. Time of Acquisition
Time is central in the sense that only property acquired af-
ter the determination date3 4 is classified as individual or marital.
For example, section 4(d) classifies income earned or accrued by
a spouse during marriage and after the determination date as
marital property.23 5 Thus, if income is earned before marriage,
but not received until afterward, it is not marital property. The
official comment states:
Actual ownership of [income received shortly after the deter-
mination date from effort or accrual of rights before the deter-
mination date becomes] fixed before the determination date
and it should not be and is not classified as marital property.3 6
Thus, if a real estate agent puts together and closes a transac-
tion before marriage, but receives the commission check from
the buyer's lender after marriage, that income would not be clas-
ery in the other spouse if the limitations are exceeded. This interpretation is consistent
with the fact that this section contains a statute of limitations (the earlier of one year
after the other spouse has notice of the gift or three years after the gift). If the aggrieved
spouse does not take timely action, the remedy is lost, and presumably, the gift is com-
plete as of its acceptance by the donee.
32. UNIF. MARITAL PROP. ACT § 6(b) (1983). The latter provision presents an ambigu-
ity. During marriage the nondonor spouse may recover the property or a compensatory
judgment to the extent of the noncompliance with § 6(a). If the recovery occurs after
death or dissolution, "it is limited to one-half of the gift. . . ." Id. If that means that a
compensatory judgment after death or dissolution could be as much as one-half of the
gift, it could be greater after death or dissolution than one-half of recovery (i.e., one
spouse's share) during marriage. Assuming that the complaining spouse is seeking a com-
pensatory judgment rather than the donated property, that spouse could thus increase
the recovery by timing it to occur after the marriage has terminated. It is doubtful that
this was the intended result.
33. Id. § 4 comment, 9A U.L.A. at 29 (Supp. 1986).
34. See supra text accompanying note 12.
35. UNIF. MARrrAL PROP. AcT § 4(d) (1983).
36. Id. § 4 comment, 9A U.L.A. at 30 (Supp. 1986).
9
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sified as marital property since it was earned before the determi-
nation date.17 Income received after the determination date for
work performed partly before and partly after the determination
date would be "mixed" property-both marital and nonmarital.
Thus, if the closing were held after the determination date, the
commission would be mixed property because it was earned
partly before and partly after the determination date.
Another problem related to time of acquisition arises when
property is purchased, or agreed to be purchased, before the de-
termination date, but payment is made partly before the deter-
mination date and partly afterward out of marital property.
What is the interest of the "community" in the property pur-
chased? Is it a right of reimbursement for the marital property
used or an interest in the property itself? 8 The choice of how to
37. The spouses could, of course, agree to classify it as marital under § 7(b).
38. The courts in the community property states have dealt with this problem in a
variety of ways. See generally W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 9, § 64. In some
states, if the right to the property is initiated before marriage, the property being pur-
chased remains separate property even though it may be paid for with community funds.
The community has a right to reimbursement from the spouse who owns the property in
the amount of the community property used. Potthoff v. Potthoff, 128 Ariz. 557, 561, 627
P.2d 708, 712 (Ct. App. 1981); Griffin v. Griffin, 102 Idaho 858, 862, 642 P.2d 949, 953
(1982); Fisher v. Fisher, 86 Idaho 131, 136, 383 P.2d 840, 842-43 (1963); McElyea v.
McElyea, 49 N.M. 322, 325, 163 P.2d 635, 637 (1945); Colden v. Alexander, 141 Tex. 134,
147, 171 S.W.2d 328, 334 (1943); Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 317, 83 S.W.2d 620, 627
(1935).
In Washington, in addition to the reimbursement for community funds and labor
added to the separate property, the community shares in any increase, due to inflation,
of the value added by such funds and labor. In re Marriage of Elam, 97 Wash. 2d 811,
817, 650 P.2d 213, 216 (1982). The net effect is to classify the community and separate
interests proportionately to their respective contributions, assuming those contributions
can be proven. There is, however, a presumption that the increase in value of separate
property is separate property. Id. The UMPA takes a similar approach to the apprecia-
tion of individual property. See UNIF. MARrrAL PROP. AcT § 4(g)(3) (1983); infra note 68
and accompanying text.
In Louisiana, if title is transferred before marriage the property is separate. Baker v.
Baker, 209 La. 1041, 1055, 26 So. 2d 132, 137 (1946). If it is transferred after marriage, it
is community. Succession of Siverd, 167 La. 383, 385, 119 So. 399, 400 (1929). In either
event, of course, there is a right to reimbursement. Deliberto v. Deliberto, 400 So. 2d
1096 (1981). The Louisiana statute specifies the manner in which the reimbursement is
to be handled. At the time of the Deliberto case, the civil code provided that the other
spouse was entitled to one-half of the increase in value attributable to the community
funds or effort. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2408 (West 1971). As of January 1, 1980, the code
provided that the other spouse was entitled to one-half of the value of the community
property at the time it was used. Id. art. 2366 (1984).
In California, the property being purchased is both community and separate, in pro-
portion to the respective amounts of separate and community property used to make the
10
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approach this problem can be an important one. For example, if
property is classified as separate, and the value of the property
has increased, the nonowning spouse is in a worse position if en-
titled to reimbursement only for the amount of community
property used in the purchase rather than for a proportionate
share of the inflated value.
The UMPA does not specify which approach is to be fol-
lowed. It does provide that when individual property appreciates
because of the efforts of the nonowning spouse, that spouse ac-
quires a marital property interest rather than a right of reim-
bursement, if the requirements of section 14(b) are met." If the
Act's treatment of the purchase of property or retirement of a
purchase money mortgage is to parallel its treatment of appreci-
ation, then payments after the determination date should also
create a marital property interest in the property rather than a
right of reimbursement. This interpretation is consistent with
section 1(1), which provides that "[a]cquire. .. includes reduc-
tion of indebtedness on encumbered property .... ,,40 The com-
ment to that subsection states: "[I]n a typical marital situation,
payment on a mortgage will be an important means of building
assets. The definition makes it clear that this is a means of ac-
quisition."' 41 Since this means of acquisition is not included in
the list of ways to acquire individual property, 2 the property
thus acquired must be marital property under the rule that all
property is marital property unless classified otherwise.43 The
best interpretation, then, is that under the UMPA such property
will be classified as mixed, and the marital and nonmarital com-
ponents will be proportionate to the respective contributions of
each.
payments. In re Marriage of Moore, 28 Cal. 3d 366, 371-72, 618 P.2d 208, 210, 168 Cal.
Rptr. 662, 664 (1980); Forbes v. Forbes, 118 Cal. App. 2d 324, 325, 257 P.2d 721, 722
(1953).
39. UNIF. MARrAL PROP. AcT § 14 comment (1983), 9A U.L.A. at 31 (Supp. 1986).
For a discussion of the treatment of appreciation under the UMPA, see infra notes 68-
133 and accompanying text.
40. Id. § 1(1).
41. Id. § 1 comment, 9A U.L.A. at 26 (Supp. 1986).
42. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
43. UNIF. MARTAL PROP. AcT § 4(a) (1983).
1986]
11
Furth: Classification of Property under the Uniform Marital Property Act
Published by Scholar Commons, 1986
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
1. Property Owned at Marriage
Section 4(f) of the UMPA provides: "Property owned by a
spouse at a marriage after the determination date is individual
property." 44 This provision is consistent with the definition of
"determination date. ' 45 Since the determination date will always
be the last to occur of the three events listed in section
1(5)-marriage, establishment of domicile in the state, or the ef-
fective date of the Act-it would be impossible for the marriage
to occur after the determination date. What must have been in-
tended is that property owned at a marriage after the effective
date of the Act will be individual property if the spouse has a
marital domicile in the state immediately after the marriage.46
The language of section 4(f) was altered substantially dur-
ing the 1983 debates on the UMPA. The Draft for Approval sub-
mitted to the Commissioners at the beginning of the debates
contained the following language: "Property owned at the time
of marriage by a person married in this state on or after the
effective date of this [Act] is individual property of that person
after the marriage. 47 The import of the quoted language is al-
most identical to this writer's suggestion of what must have been
intended by section 4(f). The one difference is that the earlier
version did not require the persons to be domiciled in the state,
but only to be married in the state, which certainly was not the
intent.
The only reference to the change in the official transcripts
of the debates is an off-hand comment that section 4(f) "has
been cleaned up a bit, and simplified, and I think it's easier the
44. Id. § 4(f).
45. See supra text accompanying note 12.
46. It is interesting to note that property owned at a marriage before either the
effective date of the Act or the establishment of a domicile in the state is not individual
property, but is only treated as if it were individual property. U MAIMTAL PROP. ACT §
4(i) (1983). This distinction was undoubtedly made to avoid creating a retroactive effect.
Property owned before the effective date of the Act is not to be reclassified by the Act
itself. Id. § 4 comment, 9A U.L.A. at 31 (Supp. 1986). Spouses may, however, reclassify
such property, either intentionally or unintentionally. See id. § 7(b) (authorizing reclas-
sification by gift or marital property agreement); id. § 14(a) (reclassification when mixing
(commingling) occurs).
47. Id. § 4(f) (Draft for Approval 1983)(submitted at the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, at Boca Raton, Florida, July 22-29, 1983).
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way it is; also lots less words [sic]."'48 It seems probable, there-
fore, that the drafters intended no major substantive change
from the original version. The use of the phrase "determination
date" was merely a stylistic error, and the provision should be
revised to state the meaning described above.
B. Source of the Property
Classification questions will frequently turn on the source of
the property. This is particularly true if "source" includes not
only the person from whom the property is acquired, but also
the means by which it is acquired.
1. Gifts to Spouses
The UMPA, following the traditional community property
rule, classifies property acquired by only one spouse through gift
or disposition at death 9 from a third person as individual prop-
erty.5 0 This rule is a natural consequence of the theory underly-
ing both the UMPA and the community property statutes:
At the foundation of [the concept of community property] is
48. 2 Transcripts of Debates, Proceedings in Committee of the Whole of the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws-Marital Property Act, July
22-26, 1983, at 248.
49. UNIF. MARITAL PROP. ACT § 1(6) (1983) defines "disposition at death" as a trans-
fer of property "by will, intestate succession, nontestamentary transfer, or other means
that take effect at the transferor's death."
50. UNIF. MARITAL PROP. AcT § 4(g)(1) (1983). Such gifts are treated as "separate
property" in all of the community property states and were so treated under the original
Spanish system as early as 693 A.D. W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 9, § 69, at
153-54. See also W. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 6, § 4:10, at 187, § 6:4, at 334.
The corresponding Wisconsin provision includes the following additional sentence:
"A distribution of principal or income from a trust created by a third person to one
spouse is the individual property of that spouse unless the trust provides otherwise."
Wis. STAT. § 766.31(7)(a) (1983-84)(emphasis added). The italicized words were added by
Act of October 22, 1985, § 80, 1985 Wis. LAws 37. A distribution to one spouse from a
trust created by a third party is essentially a gift from the third party to that spouse and
should be treated as such. The Wisconsin language insures this result. The 1985 amend-
ment relating to income was intended to simplify bookkeeping for trustees. All such dis-
tributions will be individual property even if they consist of commingled income and
principal. This amendment will, of course, enable prospective donors to defeat the rule
that income attributable to individual property is marital property if they make gifts in
trust rather than outright. It is this writer's opinion, however, that donors should have
that option.
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the principle that all wealth acquired by the joint efforts of the
husband and wife shall be common property; the theory of the
law being that, with respect to marital property acquisitions,
the marriage is a community of which each spouse is a mem-
ber, equally contributing by his or her industry to its prosper-
ity, and possessing an equal right to succeed to the property
51
Property acquired by gift, devise, or descent is not acquired by
the efforts of the spouses at all. It is not the product of the eco-
nomic union that is the marriage, nor has the donee spouse de-
prived that union of any valuable effort by producing the prop-
erty. Further, if the property is given to just one spouse, it was
presumably the intent of the donor that it be owned by that
spouse alone. The rule, therefore, is designed to give effect to the
most likely intent of the donor, while not doing violence to the
principles of community property and the UMPA. It is clearly
consistent with the theory underlying community and marital
property to make such property "individual."
The Act does not specifically provide for the classification of
gifts made to both spouses, an issue that has caused problems in
some community property states. The Texas community prop-
erty statute contains a set of presumptions similar to those
found in the UMPA. Section 5.01(a) of the Texas Family Code
classifies as separate "the property acquired by the spouse dur-
ing marriage by gift, devise, or descent . "..."I' Subsection (b)
then provides: "Community property consists of the property,
other than separate property, acquired by either spouse during
marriage." 53 Section 5.02 provides: "Property possessed by ei-
ther spcuse during or on dissolution of marriage is presumed to
be community property. 5 4 The Texas courts have construed
these statutes to mean that a gift to both spouses is a gift to
each of an undivided one-half interest in the property, as sepa-
rate property. 55
51. W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 9, § 1, at 2-3.
52. TEx. FAN. CODE ANN. § 5.01 (Vernon 1973).
53. Id. § 5.01(b).
54. Id. § 5.02.
55. McLemore v. McLemore, 641 S.W.2d 395, 397 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982); White v.
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In Andrews v. Andrews,5" the California Court of Appeals
reached the same conclusion. In that case the court relied on
extrinsic evidence and found that a gift of real property in which
apparently only the husband was named as a grantee in the deed
was, nevertheless, a gift to both spouses. The court then held,
without offering any authority or discussion, that the property
was owned by the spouses as tenants in common.
57
Arizona case law has reached the opposite result, but not
without some confusion. In Armer v. Armer,5  a real estate mort-
gage was paid with money that had been given to a couple. The
trial court held that the spouses owned the mortgaged property
as a tenancy in common, 9 but the Arizona Supreme Court,
without explanation, reversed this decision and held that the
proceeds from the gift were community property.6 0
Washington law has also been confused on this issue. In an
old federal circuit court case that construed Washington com-
munity property law, one of several alternative grounds of deci-
sion was that "the law of this state does not create community
property out of real property acquired by gift .... In plain
words [the statute declares] acquisitions by gift after marriage
to be separate property."61 This view was rejected by the Su-
preme Court of Washington in 1964 when it held that gifts to
both spouses are community property.
6 2
Although this confusion has not been explicitly avoided in
the UMPA, a careful reading of the Act and official comments
makes it clear that gifts to both spouses are marital property.
Section 4(g)(1) specifically excludes a gift to both spouses from
classification as individual property. Since such property is not
"classified otherwise" by the Act, a gift to both spouses must be
marital property under section 4(a).6 3 This conclusion is sup-
ported by the comment to section 4, which provides that "[i]f a
56. 82 Cal. App. 2d 521, 186 P.2d 744 (1947).
57. Id. at 528, 186 P.2d at 748.
58. 105 Ariz. 284, 463 P.2d 818 (1970).
59. Id. at 287, 463 P.2d at 821.
60. Id. at 291, 463 P.2d at 825.
61. Stockstill v. Bart, 47 F. 231, 234 (C.C.D. Wash. 1891).
62. In re Salvini's Estate, 65 Wash. 2d 442, 447, 397 P.2d 811, 814 (1964).
63. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. The spouses themselves could, of
course, achieve another classification by agreement or by gift under § 7(b). See supra
notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
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gift is made to both spouses, the donated property is marital
property.
064
2. Property Acquired in Exchange for Individual Property
Under section 4(g)(2) of the UMPA, property acquired in
exchange for individual property is also treated as individual
property.65 This provision simply allows an owner of property to
use it to acquire other property without reclassifying the value it
represents into marital property, even though it is acquired after
the determination date from a third person. Of course, if there
were a question about the classification of such property, the
presumption that all property of spouses is marital property
would resolve the issue. A party attempting to establish that
such property is not marital will be required to trace it from the
original individual property."
3. Appreciation of Individual Property
Section 4(g)(3) of the UMPA provides that the appreciation
of individual property is also individual except to the extent
that the appreciation is classified as marital property under Sec-
tion 14. '1 17 Section 14(b) provides:
(b) Application by one spouse of substantial labor, effort,
inventiveness, physical or intellectual skill, creativity or mana-
gerial activity on individual property of the other spouse cre-
ates marital property attributable to that application if:
(i) reasonable compensation is not received for the appli-
cation; and
(ii) substantial appreciation of the individual property of
the other spouse results from the application."
64. UNIF. MARITAL PROP. ACT § 4 comment (1983), 9A U.L.A. at 31 (Supp. 1986).
65. Id. § 4(g)(2).
66. See infra notes 145-52 and accompanying text.
67. UNIP. MARITAL PROP. ACT § 4(g)(3) (1983).
68. Id. § 14(b). A similar concept has already been recognized in Wisconsin. In
Plachta v. Plachta, 118 Wis. 2d 329, 348 N.W.2d 193 (Ct. App. 1984), it was argued that
the appreciation of a house that had been given to one spouse was marital property
subject to division under Wis. STAT. § 767.255 (1981-82), which lists certain items, includ-
ing gifts, to be excluded from the marital estate in a divorce. The statute does, however,
allow the separate property of a spouse to be included in the marital estate and divided
between the spouses if the court finds that refusal to divide would create a hardship on
[Vol. 37
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a. Whose Individual Property?
Section 14 of the UMPA only applies in the case of appreci-
ation of property of the spouse not applying the effort. It does
not apply when the appreciation sought to be classified is that of
the spouse applying the effort. The corresponding Wisconsin
statute, however, applies to the appreciation of "either spouse's
individual property." '
During the UMPA debates, there was a strong difference of
opinion over the question of whether section 14 should apply to
individual property of the other spouse.70 Proponents of the po-
sition ultimately adopted in the UMPA argued that applying
section 14 to the property of either spouse would make it very
difficult for the UMPA to be adopted in common-law states.
71
They also expressed concern that making section 14 applicable
to efforts applied to one's own individual property would mean
that the mere management of such property would create mixed
the other spouse or the children. The Plachta court observed, in dicta, that "[f]ailure to
divide separate property could cause a hardship when the nonowning spouse contributes
to the property's increased value. Under those circumstances, the trial court may dis-
tribute the nonmarital property in a manner reflecting each spouse's contribution toward
the appreciated value." Id. at 334, 348 N.W.2d at 195-96.
The quoted language also demonstrates a problem likely to be caused by use of the
word "marital" rather than "community" in the UMPA. Wisconsin attorneys and courts
refer to the marital estate for purposes of divorce as "marital property." "Marital prop-
erty" under Wis. STAT. ch. 767 (1983-84), which governs divorce, is simply not the same
as "marital property" under Wis. STAT. ch. 766 (1983-84), the Wisconsin Marital Prop-
erty Act. Nevertheless, it is likely that Chapter 766 principles may influence courts in
applying Chapter 767. The decisions in Plachta and Arneson v. Arneson, 120 Wis.2d 236,
355 N.W.2d 16 (Ct. App. 1984), supra note 21, may be early examples of that confusion.
In a recent divorce case concerning the validity of a prenuptial agreement signed in 1973,
the court actually cited Wis. STAT. § 766.58(6) (1981-82), which addresses the enforce-
ability of marital property agreements, but which did not become effective until 1986.
Hengel v. Hengel, 122 Wis. 2d 737, 745, 365 N.W.2d 16, 20 (Ct. App. 1985). See supra
note 3.
69. Wis. STAT. § 766.63(2) (1983-84). Both § 766.63(2) and UMPA § 14(b) contain
what appears to be an oversight. They apparently apply only to individual property and
not to property of a spouse owned before the determination date. There is no policy
reason to apply § 14(b) to appreciation of individual property, but not to appreciation of
other nonmarital property. Section 4(i) provides that, generally, property owned before
the determination date is to be treated as if it were individual property. This may make
§ 14(b) applicable to such property, but it is an unnecessary complexity. Wis. STAT. §
766.63(2) has, therefore, been amended to make it applicable to "property other than
marital property. . . ." Act of October 22, 1985, § 129, 1985 Wis. LAWS 37.
70. 1 Transcripts of Debates, supra note 48, at 196-210.
71. Id. at 197, 207.
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marital and individual property. It would then be difficult "to
separate ordinary appreciation from the application of manage-
ment skills. '7 2 The position adopted in section 14 of the UMPA,
however, permits one spouse to devote an excessive proportion
of time to the improvement of his or her individual property,
while granting the other spouse no apparent recourse short of
divorce. In fact, one argument against the Wisconsin position
was that in most states "equitable distribution" statutes allow
divorce courts to correct the unfair results of such activity by a
spouse: "You do have equitable distribution in most of the
states on divorce, so even if it's individual property, the judge
can give the other spouse something. ' 3 This ignores the fact
that the UMPA is not a divorce statute,7 4 but rather "a means of
establishing present shared property rights of spouses during
the marriage . . . .On dissolution, the structure of the Act as a
property statute comes into full play. The Act takes the parties
'to the door of the divorce court' only. 7 5 If a state adopted sec-
tion 14(b) of the UMPA, a spouse could apparently devote all of
his or her time to individual property, and the other spouse
could not share in the resulting appreciation other than at
divorce.
The 1983 debates on the UMPA, as well as sections 276 and
1577 of the Act itself, support this conclusion. During a discus-
sion of the question of whether or not a spouse would have a
72. Id. at 198.
73. Id. at 208.
74. The comment to § 17 states:
It is not the mission of the Act to enter into the territory of equitable distribu-
tion or other systems of property division at dissolution .... The Act is not
designed to interfere with such a division under the statutes and cases in an
adopting state or to ordain an equal division when that is not otherwise
indicated.
UNIW. MARITAL PRop. Ac'r § 17 comment (1983), 9A U.L.A. at 49 (Supp. 1986).
75. Id. prefatory note, 9A U.L.A. at 22-23 (Supp. 1986)(emphasis in original).
76. Section 2 provides:
(a) Each spouse shall act in good faith with respect to the other spouse in
matters involving marital property or other property of the other spouse. This
obligation may not be varied by a marital property agreement.
(b) Management and control by a spouse of that spouse's property that is
not marital property in a manner that limits, diminishes, or fails to produce
income from that property does not violate subsection (a).
Id. § 2.
77. Section 15 addresses interspousal remedies. It is based on § 16 of the 1983 Draft
for Approval, supra note 47.
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duty to produce income from individual property, rather than
work for its appreciation, the following exchange took place:
MR. CANTWELL: ... With respect to individual prop-
erty, the income goes into the marital pot, while that which
maximizes principal remains individual property .... [Y]ou
personally have a conflict of interest as to what is in your per-
sonal interest and what is in the marital interest; and we're
trying to remove the conflict.
MS. MUCHMORE: But the answer to the question is that
it is your intention that the court can never say that good faith
encompasses the obligation to produce income with regard to
individual property, is that right?
MR. HILLMAN: Commissioner, if you will look at the
comment on page 25, it is not intended to confer an absolute
license or a selective abrogation of Section 2. In extreme cases,
the subsection would not sanction a flagrant violation of sec-
tion 2 and a remedy under Section 16 could be sought.78
The commissioners were referring to sections 2 and 16 and the
comment to section 5 of the Draft for Approval, which was being
considered by the Committee of the Whole. The then existing
draft of the comment, which was substantially revised before fi-
nal approval, stated:
[S]ubsection (j) specifically negates the existence of any duty
or obligation to maximize income production in these circum-
stances. Thus the owner of that property can seek only appre-
ciation, only income, or any mix he or she desires. However,
the subsection is not intended to confer an absolute license or
a selective abrogation of Section 2. In extreme cases, the sub-
section would not sanction a flagrant violation of Section 2 and
a remedy under Section 16 could be sought. 9
In the draft under consideration, however, section 2 merely
provided that "[e]ach spouse shall act in good faith with respect
to the other spouse in matters involving marital property or
78. 1 Transcripts of Debates, supra note 48, at 67-68. Mr. Cantwell was the Re-
porter for the Drafting Committee on the UMPA and a commissioner from Colorado;
Ms. Muchmore was a commissioner from Iowa; and Mr. Hillman was Chairman of the
Drafting Committee and a commissioner from Rhode Island.
79. UNIF. M~ArrAL PROP. AcT § 5 comment (Draft for Approval 1983); see supra note
1986]
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other property of the other spouse."' 0 Section 16, which was re-
vised and renumbered to 15 during the debates, provided that
"[a] spouse has a claim against the other spouse for interference
with the use of or damage to the present undivided one-half
interest in marital property of the claimant spouse."' With the
exception of the quoted comment to section 5, nothing in the
language of this draft provided a cause of action for a spouse
when the other spouse devotes much of his or her time to im-
proving individual property rather than using it to produce in-
come. The comment provided the only authority.
The final version of the UMPA does not change this result.
The above-quoted language from section 2 of the draft was not
altered, but subsection (b) was added, which specifically pro-
vides that it is not a violation of the good faith requirement if a
spouse fails to produce income from his or her own property.82
The above-quoted comment to section 5 of the draft was deleted
from the final version, along with subsection (j) to which it re-
ferred, and the comment to section 2 now makes it clear that a
spouse has no duty to produce income. Finally, section 15(a),
which creates a remedy for one spouse against the other for
breach of the good faith requirement of section 2, refers to dam-
age only to marital property, not to income or individual
property.
3
The UMPA, therefore, does not prevent one spouse from
working, perhaps exclusively, to improve that spouse's individ-
ual property. Nor does it require that a spouse reimburse the
"community" for the value of his or her time or for any portion
of the appreciation caused by efforts applied to that spouse's
own individual property.
Two recent Texas cases illustrate the difficulty that section
14 of the UMPA may cause for the nonowning spouse. In Val-
lone v. Vallone,4 the parties were married in 1966. In 1969, the
80. Id. § 2 (emphasis added).
81. Id. § 16 (emphasis added).
82. For text of this subsection, see supra note 76.
83. This may have been an oversight. Although § 2 creates a duty of good faith in
matters involving marital property or other property of the other spouse, § 15 creates a
remedy for damage only to marital property. If it is necessary to create a statutory rem-
edy for breach of the duty toward marital property, why is it not necessary to create a
remedy for breach of the duty toward nonmarital property?
84. 644 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. 1983).
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husband's father gave him the assets of a restaurant business. A
few months later, when he incorporated the business, its assets
consisted of the gift, valued at $9,365, and other assets, which
were apparently community property, valued at $10,298. The
separate property (the gift) made up slightly over forty-seven
percent of the initial capital. When the Vallones divorced, the
trial court found that the corporation was worth $1,000,000. The
husband received, at least for the only year mentioned in the
supreme court's opinion, salary and bonuses of $200,000. The
trial court held that forty-seven percent of the stock, as valued
at the time of divorce, was the husband's separate property be-
cause it was traceable to the gift of $9,365. The supreme court
affirmed because the wife had not properly pleaded a claim for
reimbursement to the community from the husband. 5 A strong
dissent objected that the community should be reimbursed for
community efforts:
The majority apparently finds solace in its determination that
the community received "adequate compensation." However,
what is adequate compensation is not the issue and is irrele-
vant here. Most people would agree that $200,000 annual sal-
ary is adequate compensation for a successful basketball
player, actress, or restauranteur [sic]. When these individuals
actually earn $1,000,000 per year, the entire $1,000,000 belongs
to the community estate, not just the amount an appellate
court may deem "adequate compensation." The rule is not that
a portion of the earnings found to be adequate compensation
for labor belongs to the community estate. The rule always has
been that earnings of a spouse-all of the earnings-are com-
munity property.86
In Jensen v. Jensen,87 the husband organized a corporation
in March 1975 and acquired 48,455 of 100,000 outstanding
shares for $1.56 per share ($75,589.80). He was married in July
1975 and was divorced in May 1980. At the time of the trial, Mr.
Jensen's expert appraised the stock at $13.48 per share
($653,173.40) and Mrs. Jensen's expert appraised it at $25.77 per
share ($1,248,685.30). In addition, Mr. Jensen had received sal-
85. Id. at 459.
86. Id. at 461 (Sondock, J., dissenting). Under § 14(b), if the spouse receives "rea-
sonable compensation," the appreciation would not be marital.
87. 665 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. 1984).
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ary, bonuses, and dividends on the stock (community property
in Texas) ranging from $64,065.97 in 1976 to $115,000.00 in
1979. The trial court held that all of the stock owned by Mr.
Jensen was separate property, even though the stock had appre-
ciated by a factor of about nine during the five years of mar-
riage, and entered a finding that the corporation's success was
primarily due to the "time, toil and effort of [Mr. Jensen]." 8
The Jensen case is remarkable because it took four appel-
late opinions to reach a final resolution-a fact that demon-
strates the difficult questions raised in this area. The Texas
Court of Civil Appeals concluded that the trial court had mis-
characterized the appreciation as separate property and held
that "if one spouse's separate property is increased because of
the time, talent, and industry of either spouse, exceeding that
required to preserve the separate property, then the increase be-
comes community property."89 The Supreme Court of Texas is-
sued three separate opinions on the case.
In Jensen I the supreme court affirmed the court of appeals'
decision, pointing out that Mr. Jensen admitted he had spent at
least ninety percent of his time running the corporation:
We hold that an expenditure of 90 percent of one's time in the
operation and development of a business exceeds a reasonable
amount of time one may devote to one's separate estate. Fur-
ther, we hold that the salary and dividends received by Mr.
Jensen are in adequate compensation [sic] where the stock's
enhanced value is substantially more than the sums received
by the community estate .... An increase in the shares of
stock, though separate property in origin, should belong to the
community.00
The court was careful to point out that it was not "characteriz-
ing" (classifying) the stock. The stock was and remained sepa-
rate property. The community, however, was entitled to be com-
pensated "for the increase [in the value of the stock] that
occurred during marriage.' 91
88. Id. at 108-09.
89. Jensen v. Jensen, 629 S.W.2d 222, 224 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982).
90. Jensen v. Jensen, 26 Tsx. Sup. CT. J. 480, 481-82 (July 6, 1983).
91. Id. It is interesting that in both the decision of the court of appeals and in the
first supreme court opinion, all of the appreciation was apparently held to be community
property.
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In Jensen 11,92 when a new justice joined the dissenters in
Jensen I, the court withdrew the earlier decision and reversed
the court of appeals:
The community property states have adopted variations of
either "reimbursement" or "community ownership" theories.
Common to both theories is the general concept that the com-
munity should receive whatever remuneration is paid to a
spouse for his or her time and effort because the time and ef-
fort of each spouse belongs to the community. . . . [T]he two
theories diverge when it comes to the valuation of the commu-
nity's claim against separately owned stock that has appreci-
ated by virtue of a spouse's time and effort. The "reimburse-
ment" theory provides that. . . the community is entitled for
reimbursement for the reasonable value of the time and effort
of ... the spouses which contributed to the increase in value
of the stock. The "community ownership" theory, on the other
hand, holds that any increase in the value of the stock as a
result of the time and effort of the owner spouse becomes com-
munity property.93
The two Jensen opinions raise a clear question of policy:
What should be the measure of compensation to the community
for effort applied to the separate property of the titled spouse?
If the entrepreneurial ability of one spouse enhances the value
of individual property in excess of what would ordinarily be
thought of as "reasonable" salary, should the other spouse share
in the excess? In Jensen II9 the Texas Supreme Court issued a
compromise opinion in which eight of the justices joined, with
the ninth concurring in the result. The court continued to follow
the "reimbursement theory" rather than the "community owner-
ship" theory, but remanded to the trial court on the ground that
there was no adequate factual support for the trial court's hold-
ing that Mr. Jensen's compensation was reasonable. The court
also stated that, on remand, "the burden of proving a charge
upon the shares . . . will be upon . . . Mrs. Jensen.
''e5
The appreciation may, however, be taken into consideration
in determining whether the compensation was reasonable. At the
92. Jensen v. Jensen, 27 TEx. Sup. CT. J. 68 (November 9, 1983).
93. Id. at 69.
94. Jensen v. Jensen, 665 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. 1984).
95. Id. at 110.
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first trial, Mr. Jensen's expert testified that Mr. Jensen had been
adequately compensated, but added that his opinion was based
primarily on the fact of Jensen's stock ownership. He stated that
"without the stock ownership he seriously doubted that Mr. Jen-
sen would have stayed with [the corporation]."96 It is quite
likely, therefore, that part of his compensation was in the form
of appreciation of his stock and the community should be reim-
bursed for that.
The Vallone and Jensen problem has, ostensibly, been
avoided in the UMPA. The spouse who devotes all of his or her
efforts to operating and improving a business that is his or her
individual property will not have to reimburse the marital part-
nership for the value of the effort that has been diverted from
income to appreciation. This, at least, is the apparent conse-
quence of section 14(b), the only provision specifically address-
ing appreciation of individual property.9 7 Courts, however, may
be tempted to follow the diverted income into the appreciation
and declare that part of it is marital property, perhaps on the
theory that all income is marital property and a spouse should
not be allowed to subvert the purpose of the UMPA by hiding
income in appreciation. A court might reason that it is unfair to
require a spouse to establish a right to such appreciation under
an equitable distribution statute98 when the other spouse has, in
effect, withheld part of the fruits of his or her productivity from
the marital partnership. The Texas court's difficulty with this
problem demonstrates the persuasiveness of such an argument.
The Texas courts have characterized the reimbursement so-
lution, which has no statutory basis, as an equitable remedy:
The cases recognizing the general right of reimbursement be-
tween [community and separate] estates will disclose that the
right of the estate claiming and entitled to reimbursement is
not a fixed right or title in the property sought to be charged,
but is an equity .... The decisions have correctly classified
the right of the one making such advancement as an equity,
96. Id.
97. An attempt was made during the debates on the UMPA to make the section
applicable to individual property of both spouses, but it was defeated. See supra notes
69-75 and accompanying text. A construction of the Act that treated appreciation of the
individual property of the spouse applying the effort as marital property would be incon-
sistent with that "legislative history."
98. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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and the final determination of the rights of the respective par-
ties is to be determined upon equitable principles . . . . It is
not a mere question of balancing ledger accounts."
It would not be surprising to see a court faced with section 14(b)
of the UMPA adopt a similar approach and allow an "equitable
reimbursement."
If section 14(b) is applicable to the appreciation, the result
of a finding of no reasonable compensation under the UMPA
will be quite different from the result in Jensen. Under the Jen-
sen approach the community is to receive the value of the effort
it should have received at the time the effort was performed. 100
Under the UMPA, the appreciation itself will be marital.10 ' This
could produce some interesting results. For example, if a spouse
who controlled a corporation paid himself or herself $200,000
per year while the stock appreciated from $10,000 to $1,000,000,
the other spouse would receive nothing if $200,000 were reasona-
ble, but would receive $495,000 if it were not. Under the Jensen
approach, the community would receive the value of the effort,
which could fall between the two extremes. The UMPA provi-
sion would, in effect, penalize the spouse who failed to calculate
accurately (in the opinion of the finder of fact) the value of rea-
sonable compensation, a difficult task at best.
The question of whether the marital partnership is entitled,
in equity, to reimbursement is avoided under the Wisconsin Act,
which specifically provides that appreciation of the individual
property of either spouse is marital property unless reasonable
compensation was received for the effort.10 2 Assuming that the
appreciation and effort applied are substantial and that the ap-
preciation is attributable to that effort, the issue in Wisconsin
99. Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 316-17, 83 S.W.2d 620, 627 (1935). See also Han-
rahan v. Sims, 70 Ariz. App. 313, 512 P.2d 617 (1973); Colden v. Alexander, 141 Tex. 134,
171 S.W.2d 328 (1943). Other courts have granted an "equitable lien" to protect the right
of reimbursement. See, e.g., Gapsch v. Gapsch, 76 Idaho 44, 277 P.2d 278 (1954); Miracle
v. Miracle, 101 Wash. 2d 137, 675 P.2d 1229 (1984)(no right of reimbursement if contrib-
uting spouse received reciprocal benefit; equity will then find that the contributing
spouse has been reimbursed).
100. 665 S.W.2d at 110.
101. Section 14(b) provides that the effort "creates marital property." The comment
states that "the right of the spouse who created the marital property is to an interest in
the asset and not to a right of reimbursement or a lien for a specific amount." UNIF.
MARITAL PROP. AcT § 14 comment (1983), 9A U.L.A. at 45-46 (Supp. 1986).
102. Wis. STAT. § 766.63(2) (1983-84).
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will be whether the salary paid to the spouse working with the
individual property was "reasonable.
'" 10 3
b. Activity of a Spouse
The description in section 14(b) of the types of activity a
spouse might engage in that would cause the appreciation of in-
dividual property to be marital property was designed to be in-
clusive. It would be difficult to conceive of an activity not en-
compassed by the description. The trading of securities and
commodities, for example, would be included, 04 as would, pre-
sumably, painting the kitchen, persuading a potential buyer that
the twenty-year-old family jalopy is a valuable antique, and ac-
cidently discovering oil while spading the garden.
Section 14(b) refers to "substantial appreciation" resulting
from "[a]pplication . . . of . . activity on . . . property
. ... "05 It is obvious that appreciation caused by inflation is
not included. A more interesting issue, however, is presented
when appreciation results from a spouse's activities, but not
from the direct application of the activity to the property. Sup-
pose, for example, that a spouse gains fame as a national hero.
The value of the other spouse's childhood diary then appreciates
substantially as a result, at least in the eyes of Hollywood, al-
though the owner has not written anything in the diary since
marriage. Is that appreciation marital property? In other words,
must the activity be directed toward the property or is it suffi-
cient that the appreciation result from the activity? The com-
ment to section 14 ignores this issue; it refers to application of
personal effort "to" individual property illustrated by examples
of improvements by physical effort applied to real estate. 06
The question may be approached from two quite different
perspectives. If one accepts the fundamental principle of the
103. It should also be noted that the "reasonable compensation" of § 766.63(2)(a)
means compensation to the marital partnership, not compensation that is individual
property. 1 Transcripts of Debates, supra note 48, at 205; W. MCCLANAHAN, supra note
6, § 6:18.
104. 1 Transcripts of Debates, supra note 48, at 219. For text of § 14(b), see supra
note 68 and accompanying text.
105. The corresponding Wisconsin statute uses the language "activity to. . . prop-
erty." Wis. STAT. § 766.63(2) (1983-84)(emphasis added).
106. UNIF. MARITAL PROP. ACT § 14 comment (1983), 9A U.L.A. at 45 (Supp. 1986).
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UMPA and community property law that the economic rewards
of the spouses' effort during marriage are to be shared,0 7 then
all economic rewards of spouses' effort during marriage should
be marital property, not just those that result from application
of effort to the particular property. In the hypothetical, presum-
ably the spouse's fame resulted from effort, and the economic
results of that effort should be marital property in order to be
consistent with the underlying theory of the UMPA. Salary, en-
dorsements, and the like received during marriage as a result of
the fame certainly would be marital property.
On the other hand, if the authors of the UMPA had in-
tended that such indirect appreciation be marital property, they
could easily have made that result clear by using language such
as the following: "Appreciation of individual property of one
spouse which is attributable to the substantial labor, effort, in-
ventiveness, physical or intellectual skill, creativity or manage-
rial activity of the other spouse is marital property, if. .. .
Section 14(b) requires not only that the appreciation be at-
tributable to the activity of the spouse, but also that the activity
be applied to that property-a result inconsistent with the fun-
damental principle stated above.10 9 Of course, not all value pro-
duced by effort during marriage is marital property. If a spouse
gives labor to a friend or relative and the donee's property ap-
preciates as a result, this appreciation is not marital property. It
belongs to the owner of the property. The diary, however, is the
individual property of a spouse and is more clearly within the
UMPA's fundamental principle. Nevertheless, since the effort
must be applied on the individual property, appreciation result-
ing from an indirect cause is not marital.
c. The Four Elements of Section 14(b)
Section 14(b) contains the following four separate elements
that must be established before appreciation can be classified as
marital: (1) the effort must be substantial; (2) the appreciation
must be substantial; (3) the appreciation must be "attributable
to" the efforts of a spouse; and (4) the spouse must not have
107. Id. prefatory note, 9A U.L.A. at 24 (Supp. 1986).
108. Compare this language with § 14(b), supra text accompanying note 68.
109. See supra text accompanying note 107.
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received reasonable compensation for the efforts.11 0
(1) The Double Test of Substantiality
Section 14(b) includes a double test of substantiality. Both
the effort performed by the spouse and the amount of apprecia-
tion itself must be substantial. One might ask, however, what
the word "substantial" means in this context. Although it is
used twice and is obviously of great import, it is not defined in
the Act.1
The following hypothetical illustrates the problem
presented. Assume that a business, which is the individual prop-
erty of one spouse, has a value of $10,000,000. The other spouse
applies substantial effort to the business, causing appreciation in
the amount of $25,000. Is appreciation of $25,000 "substantial"?
110. Apparently the burden of proof under § 14(b) is the reverse of the burden in
other sections of the UMPA. Ordinarily, the party seeking to prove that property is not
marital property will bear the burden of proof because of the presumption in § 4(b) that
all property is marital property. Section 4(g)(3), however, provides that appreciation of
individual property is individual "except to the extent that the appreciation is classified
as marital property under Section 14." It is the exception that such appreciation is mari-
tal. It would seem that the party seeking to establish the exception should bear the bur-
den of proof. This conclusion is supported by the comment to § 14, which states that this
section "articulates a bias against creation of marital property." UNIF. MArrAL PRop.
AcT § 14 comment (1983), 9A U.L.A. at 45 (Supp. 1986). There is precedent for such an
approach. The Washington Supreme Court has held that there is a presumption that the
appreciation of separate property is separate. Elam v. Elam, 97 Wash. 2d 811, 650 P.2d
213 (1982).
The Arizona Supreme Court, on the other hand, has held that "when the value of
separate property is increased the burden is upon the spouse who contends that the
increase is also separate property to prove that the increase is the result of the inherent
value of the property itself and is not the product of the work effort of the community."
Cockrill v. Cockrill, 124 Ariz. 50, 52, 601 P.2d 1334, 1336 (1979). The court relied on the
presumption in favor of community property.
The meaning of "reasonable compensation" and methods available to establish its
value are familiar concepts and are not discussed further in this article.
111. The word "substantial" is not defined in the Wisconsin statutes either. The
Wisconsin Court of Appeals has conceded the ambiguous nature of the word. In Town of
Pleasant Prairie v. Department of Local Affairs and Dev., 108 Wis. 2d 465, 475, 322
N.W.2d 486, 492 (Ct. App. 1982), af'd, 113 Wis. 2d 327, 334 N.W.2d 893 (1983), the
court stated that "the meaning of 'substantial' in the context of the statute [under con-
sideration] is not readily apparent." That statute provides that the territory of an area
seeking to incorporate as a village or city "beyond the most densely populated square
mile shall have the potential for residential or other urban land use development on a
substantial scale within the next three years." Wis. STAT. § 66.016(1)(b) (1983-84)(em-
phasis added). The court deferred to the agency's determination that "substantial," as
applied to the area in question, meant 25%. 108 Wis. 2d at 476, 322 N.W.2d at 492.
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Should the finder of fact consider the amount of appreciation in
light of the previous value, or may it simply consider the abso-
lute dollar amount? In this example, it is quite possible that ju-
rors would say that $25,000, taken in the abstract, is substantial.
It is, however, only 0.25 percent of the value of the business. If
asked whether appreciation of 0.25 percent is substantial, the
answer may be less certain.
112
Illustrations of substantial effort were given at the 1983 de-
bates on the UMPA. One spouse owns property that is zoned
residential before marriage. After the marriage, the other spouse
obtains a rezoning of the property to commercial, with a result-
ing increase in value. It was agreed at the debates, without ob-
jection, that the effort described was not substantial.11 3 Another
example given was the following: One spouse, a "brilliant inves-
tor," sells the other spouse's individual gold at exactly the right
moment and reinvests the proceeds in real estate and common
stock. It was agreed that the amount of the appreciation attribu-
table to the efforts of the spouse doing the investing would be
marital;1 4 thus, this effort must have been viewed by the debat-
ers as "substantial." A rezoning matter could require a few min-
utes or hundreds of hours of work; the same is true of making
investment decisions. What, then, does "substantial" mean in
this context? Because courts will inevitably be asked whether
certain amounts of appreciation and effort are or are not, as a
matter of law, "substantial," the question is of more than aca-
demic interest.
The comment to section 14 of the UMPA suggests one
means of interpreting the word substantial: "The rule of the sec-
112. In In re Krause's Estate, 173 Wash. 1, 21 P.2d 268 (1933), the issue was
whether one party had "substantially benefited" the property of the decedent. The court
stated:
"Substantial" as an adjective means something worth while as distin-
guished from something without value or merely nominal.. . . In its ordinary
parlance "substantially benefited"... would mean some worth while advan-
tage, profit or good.. . . [T]here can be no question but that the saving of real
estate from loss by sale for taxes and assessments ... would be substantially
benefiting the real estate.
Id. at 8, 21 P.2d at 270 (citations omitted). Under such a definition, substantial appreci-
ation would not mean relative to total value, but merely "worth while," i.e. of more than
nominal value.
113. 1 Transcripts of Debates, supra note 48, at 226-28.
114. Id. at 219-20.
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tion is strict. It articulates a bias against creation of marital
property from such an act unless the effort has been substantial
and has been responsible for substantial appreciation. Routine,
normal and usual effort is not substantial.""
5
The UMPA debates also shed some light on the meaning of
"substantial." First, the two uses of the word "substantial" were
referred to as having a single purpose: "I think you should note
in lines 18 and 25118 the word 'substantial' [sic] That is very
studied, to avoid the kind of things. . . just mentioned creating
mixed property. We are talking about substantial labor. . . and
substantial appreciation."1 7 The speaker was referring to such
activities as merely posting a "For Sale" sign on real property or
making a decision not to sell a stock because its value is
increasing.
It was the intent of the Commissioners to avoid creating
marital property every time such ordinary, but minimal, activity
takes place. This approach has also been taken in community
property states. A Louisiana court, for example, stated that "mi-
nor repairs . . . are not to be considered as 'improvements of a
substantial, permanent character' . ".".., The community is
not to be reimbursed for the value of time and effort expended
merely to manage and preserve separate property of either
spouse." 9 It is this writer's opinion that the double test of sub-
stantiality was included to avoid nuisance suits or frequent liti-
gation when the effort or appreciation, or both, is minimal. This
would explain the "bias" built into the statute against the crea-
tion of marital property. 120 This approach is a reasonable com-
promise that prevents the creation of marital property when the
spouse who applied the effort made only a "routine" effort.
115. UNIF. MARITAL PRoP. AcT § 14 comment (1983), 9A U.L.A. at 45 (Supp.
1986)(emphasis added).
116. The speaker was referring to the Draft for Approval, supra note 47, at 44.
117. 1 Transcripts of Debates, supra note 48, at 199.
118. Deliberto v. Deliberto, 400 So. 2d 1096, 1100 n. 5 (La. Ct. App. 1981)(quoting
Courrege v. Colgin, 51 La. Ann. 1069, -, 25 So. 942, 943 (1899)).
119. Jensen v. Jensen, 665 S.W.2d 107, 109 (Tex. 1984); Vallone v. Vallone, 644
S.W.2d 455, 459 (Tex. 1983).
120. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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(2) Appreciation Attributable to a Spouse
Section 14(b) requires that the appreciation be attributable
to the activity of the spouse. Given the fluctuating nature of
prices, how will one separate the portion attributable to the ef-
forts of a spouse from the portion attributable to the economy,
or as it is sometimes stated in the community property states,
attributable to an increase "in the intrinsic value" of the prop-
erty?121 Let us return to the two illustrations provided during
the debates on the UMPA.122 In the first example, in which the
nonowning spouse causes residential property to be rezoned as
commercial, the amount attributable to the effort could proba-
bly be established through an appraiser's testimony regarding
the value immediately before and immediately after the rezon-
ing. It would be more difficult to determine the marital property
component in the second example, in which the nonowning
spouse decides to sell certain gold and reinvest the proceeds. Is
it fair to assume that all of the increase in value is attributable
to the efforts of the spouse who watches the market and man-
ages the investment? Should not some of the appreciation be
attributed to economic forces?
The community property states have dealt with this prob-
lem through a process known as "apportionment." Two quite
different apportionment approaches have been developed 123 to
determine whether and how much appreciation is attributable to
the efforts of a spouse. One method, commonly referred to as the
"Pereira approach,"'124 allocates a fair return on the separate
property and treats the balance of the increase as community
property.12 5 Under the second method, the "Van Camp ap-
proach, ' 126 the court determines a reasonable value for the effort
121. Strohm v. Strohm, 182 Cal. App. 2d 53, 61, 5 Cal. Rptr. 884, 889 (1960).
122. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
123. In addition to the California and Nevada cases discussed below, see Cockrill v.
Cockrill, 124 Ariz. 50, 54, 601 P.2d 1334, 1338 (1979)("the trial court . . . may select
whichever [method] will achieve substantial justice between the parties"); Katson v.
Katson, 43 N.M. 214, 217-18, 89 P.2d 524, 526-27 (1939).
124. See Pereira v. Pereira, 156 Cal. 1, 7, 103 P. 488, 491 (1909)(allocating "at least
... the usual interest on a long investment well secured" to the separate property).
125. Beam v. Bank of Am., 6 Cal. 3d 12, 18, 490 P.2d 257, 261, 98 Cal. Rptr. 137, 141
(1971). The "legal interest rate" is sometimes used as the reasonable rate of return on
the separate property. Id. at 19, 490 P.2d at 262, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 142.
126. See Van Camp v. Van Camp, 53 Cal. App. 17, 199 P. 885, 889 (1921). Van
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of the spouse, allocates that proportion of the increase to the
community estate and treats the balance as separate property.127
Apparently, either approach may be used in a single jurisdiction,
depending on which is appropriate and equitable in a particular
situation.
1 28
A Nevada case, Schulman v. Schulman,1 29 provides a good
illustration of the choice between the Pereira and Van Camp
approaches. The husband owned and operated a meat market
and processing business in the Las Vegas area. The trial court
held that the economic growth in the area and the fact that the
business had received a Small Business Administration loan out-
weighed any effort applied to the property by the couple.130 The
supreme court affirmed the trial court's decision that it would be
unfair to use the Pereira rule, "'which effects a greater attribu-
tion of profits to the industry of the community.'-131" In fact,
when it adopted the Pereira and Van Camp rules, the Nevada
court observed: "Both approaches have vitality and may be ap-
plied as circumstances warrant. Courts of this state are not
bound by either the Pereira or the Van Camp approach, but
may select whichever will achieve substantial justice between the
parties." 132
Although courts in states adopting the UMPA will not be
bound by any particular rule relating to apportionment and ap-
preciation, some rule or rules will need to be formulated since
situations like the one in Schulman are certain to occur.
133
Camp did not involve the appreciation of a particular piece of property, but rather large
dividends paid to the husband by the company he headed and his resulting accumula-
tions of property. The court held that since the husband had been paid an adequate
salary, Pereira v. Pereira, 156 Cal. 1, 103 P. 48 (1909) was inapplicable. This approach is
similar to that of UMPA § 14(b): if reasonable compensation is received by the spouse
doing the work, any appreciation of individual property is individual.
127. Beam v. Bank of Am., 6 Cal. 3d 12, 18, 490 P.2d 257, 261, 98 Cal. Rptr. 137, 141
(1971); Johnson v. Johnson, 89 Nev. 244, 247, 510 P.2d 625, 626-27 (1973)(citing Beam).
128. Beam v. Bank of Am., 6 Cal. 3d 12, 18, 490 P.2d 257, 261, 98 Cal. Rptr. 137, 141
(1971); Logan v. Forster, 114 Cal. App. 2d 587, 600, 250 P.2d 730, 737 (1952).
129. 92 Nev. 707, 558 P.2d 525 (1976).
130. Id. at 711, 588 P.2d at 528.
131. Id. n.2 (quoting the district judge).
132. Johnson v. Johnson, 89 Nev. 244, 247, 510 P.2d 625, 626-27 (1973)(citing Beam
v, Bank of Am., 6 Cal. 3d 12, 490 P.2d 257, 98 Cal. Rptr. 137 (1971)).
133. See generally COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW OF IDAHO VI-7 to VI-18 (1982)(dis-
cussing the Pereira and Van Camp rules and attempting to improve on them). This work
notes that the community property states following the "American rule" that income
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C. Forms of Holding Property
Section 11 of the UMPA lists several ways in which prop-
erty may be held,3 all of which are directly related to the provi-
sions on management and control of property.135 For example,
section 11(a) authorizes listing the names of the spouses on the
document of title in the alternative,3 6 while section 11(b) autho-
rizes listing them in the conjunctive.'3 7 Under section 5(a)(6) ei-
ther spouse, acting alone, may "manage and control" marital
property held in the alternative, pursuant to section 11(a); under
section 5(b), however, spouses may manage and control marital
property held in the conjunctive, pursuant to section 11(b), only
if they act together. Thus, the choice between these two forms of
holding marital property will be dictated by the spouses' wishes
concerning management and control. Section 11(c) authorizes
holding property as individual property, while section 11(d) per-
mits spouses to hold property in any other form permitted by
law, including joint tenancy.
Section 11(e) creates a new form of holding property: "sur-
vivorship marital property."' 38 Unlike the law in at least some of
from separate property is separate (Arizona, California, Nevada, New Mexico, and Wash-
ington) have faced the "most perplexing problems of apportionment" because they must
distinguish between income as a return on capital and income as a return on labor. Id. at
VI-8. It is also pointed out, however, that the states following the "civil law" rule that
income from separate property is community (Idaho, Louisiana, and Texas) have also
faced apportionment problems since it must sometimes be determined "whether the
community labor of either spouse contributed to the increase in value of the separate
property." Id. at VI-13 to VI-14. This is precisely the problem posed by UMPA § 14(b).
134. The Act provides the following definition of "held":
Property is "held" by a person only if a document of title to the property
is registered, recorded, or filed in a public office in the name of the person or a
writing that customarily operates as a document of title to the type of property
is issued for the property in the person's name.
UNIF. MARITAL PROP. AcT § 1(9) (1983).
135. Section 1(11) defines management and control as "the right to buy, sell, use,
transfer, exchange, abandon, lease, consume, expend, assign, create a security interest in,
mortgage, encumber, dispose of, institute or defend a civil action regarding, or otherwise
deal with, property as if it were property of an unmarried person." Id. § 1(11).
136. Section 11(a) provides in part: "Spouses may hold marital property in a form
that designates the holder of it by the words '(name of one spouse) or (name of other
spouse) as marital property"' Id. § 11(a)(emphasis added).
137. Section 11(b) (1983) provides in part: "Spouses may hold marital property in a
form that designates the holder of it by the words '(name of one spouse) and (name of
other spouse) as marital property"' Id. § 11(b)(emphasis added).
138. The Wisconsin statute also classifies a homestead acquired exclusively between
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the community property states, 139 the UMPA allows use of joint
tenancies when the property involved is marital property. 1 0 A
married couple that, before the UMPA, would choose to put
property in joint tenancy to take advantage of the right of survi-
vorship will have to choose between joint tenancy and the new
survivorship marital property. Assume for example that a couple
purchases a home with wages earned after their determination
date. The home will be marital property unless they effectively
agree that it is not.1 4 ' Since selection of the form of holding the
property has nothing to do with determining its classification,
the spouses will be free to choose whichever form is preferable.
The respective rights of each spouse should not be affected by
the choice, since the property is marital in either event. For
third parties, however, it may make a difference. A title exam-
iner, for example, will not be able to determine the classification
of property from the record if it is held in joint tenancy; the
classification of survivorship marital property, however, will be
clear from the documents of title. Knowing the classification
may also make a difference for third parties curious about rights
of management and contro1 42 or for creditors whose rights vary
with the classification of property.1 4 Therefore, under most cir-
spouses after the determination date as "survivorship marital property." Wis. STAT. §
766.605 (1983-84).
McClanahan has described survivorship marital property as "a new concept not used
in any existing [community property] statutes." W. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 6, § 14.5,
at 642. This is not entirely accurate. Nevada community property law provides for "com-
munity property with a right of survivorship." NEV. REv. STAT. § 111.064 (1981). Holding
marital property in one of the other forms described in the UMPA does not carry with it
a right of survivorship. UNIF. MARrrMA PROP. AcT § 4(c) (1983)("Each spouse has a pre-
sent undivided one-half interest in marital property."). Also, no right of survivorship is
created by the mere act of creating marital property. Id. § 11(e)("Holding marital prop-
erty in a form described in subsection (a) or (b) does not alone establish survivorship
ownership between the spouses with respect to the property held in that form.").
139. Tomaier v. Tomaier, 23 Cal. 2d 754, 758, 146 P.2d 905, 907 (1944). See also 32
CAL. JuR. 3D Family Law § 394 (1977).
140, This fact is not obvious in the Act. Section 11(d) authorizes spouses to hold
property in joint tenancy, but says nothing about the classification of such property.
Nevertheless, since § 4(a) provides that all property of spouses is marital property unless
classified otherwise by the Act, and the Act contains nothing to indicate that joint tenan-
cies between spouses cannot be marital, one must conclude that joint tenancy does not
affect the marital status of property. Unlike the situation in California, joint tenancy is
not incompatible with marital property under the UMPA.
141. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
142. UmNF. MARITAL PROP. AcT § 5 (1983).
143. Id. § 8(b).
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cumstances it would seem that survivorship marital property
would be the preferable form. The parties are more likely to un-
derstand what they own, and the record title will be clear.
Section 11(d) authorizes spouses to hold property in any
form permitted by law, including "a form that provides for sur-
vivorship ownership. ' 144 It does not, however, specifically state
that when marital property is held in such a form, the survivor-
ship feature works like survivorship in the common-law joint
tenancy. Do the rights in marital property granted to creditors
by section 8 survive the death of the spouse who incurred the
obligation, or are they lost, as they are in a joint tenancy? May a
spouse sever such a joint tenancy unilaterally, or do the manage-
ment and control rules of section 5 control the marital compo-
nent of such property? A joint tenancy held in the form of hus-
band and wife may be severed by one spouse. Marital property
held in that form would require the act of both spouses to con-
vey an interest in the property. What is the result if joint ten-
ancy and marital property are combined? There are similar am-
biguities related to management and control of tenancies in
common that have a marital component.
Because of these uncertainties, the Wisconsin version of the
UMPA was amended to clarify how joint tenancies and tenan-
cies in common are to function when they are partially or en-
tirely marital property. Under this amendment, if the incidents
of joint tenancy or tenancy in common conflict with the inci-
dents of property classification under marital property, the inci-
dents of joint tenancy or tenancy in common will control.14 The
amendment, however, contains one exception: joint tenancy ex-
clusively between spouses created by the spouses after the deter-
mination date would be survivorship marital property, even if it
is labeled a joint tenancy in the document of title.146
D. Tracing
There are several provisions in the UMPA that will require
tracing. Section 4(g)(2) provides that property is individual
144. Id. § 11(d).
145. Act of October 22, 1985, § 123, 1985 Wis. LAws 37. It should be noted that this
amendment does not affect the spouses' remedies. Id.
146. Id. § 124.
1986]
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property if it is acquired in exchange for or with the proceeds of
other individual property of a spouse. Thus, a party seeking to
establish that property is individual might have to trace it as
proceeds of other individual property. Sections 17 and 18 pro-
vide that at death and dissolution property acquired before the
determination date that would have been marital property if ac-
quired after the determination date must be treated as if it were
marital property. This provision will require tracing to deter-
mine which assets would have been marital and which would
have been individual. 147 Section 4(h) provides that enactment of
the UMPA does not alter the classification of property acquired
before the determination date. If this provision applies to prop-
erty acquired in exchange for predetermination date property, as
was probably intended, it will also give rise to a tracing
problem.148
Section 14(a) of the UMPA provides that mixing marital
property with property of any other classification reclassifies the
nonmarital property as marital, unless the nonmarital compo-
nent can be traced. This rule is a natural extension of the pre-
sumption of section 4(b) that all property of spouses is marital
property.149 The result is that all property of spouses is marital
unless the party claiming otherwise meets the burden of proving
that it is not.
Despite the importance of "tracing" under the Act, the term
is never defined. The comment to section 14 states that "tracing
would necessarily be done under the appropriate tracing rules of
an adopting state."'150 That assumes, however, that there are
"appropriate tracing rules" in states that adopt the UMPA.
147. MARITAL PROPERTY LAW IN WISCONSIN, supra note 3, at 3-7.
148. The Wisconsin act has been clarified by adding to the corresponding Wisconsin
provision, § 766.31(8), the following language: "or the classification and ownership rights
of property acquired after the determination date in exchange for or with the proceeds of
property acquired before the determination date." Act of October 22, 1985, § 82, 1985
WIs. LAws 37.
149. The same rule is followed in the community property states. See, e.g., Houska
v. Houska, 95 Idaho 568, 570, 512 P.2d 1317, 1319 (1973) ("The commingling doctrine is a
special application of the general presumption that all property acquired during mar-
riage is community property."). This presumption has been described both as a rule of
evidence, IV. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 9, § 60, at 118-19, and as a rule of law,
Comment, The Mix-Hicks Mix: Tracing Troubles Under California's Community Prop-
erty System, 26 UCLA L. REV. 1231, 1237-38 (1979). The distinction between substance
and procedure would seem to be significant only in a multi-jurisdiction context.
150. UNIF. MARITAL PROP. ACT § 14 comment (1983), 9A U.L.A. at 44 (Supp. 1986).
[Vol. 37486
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Wisconsin case law on tracing is not well developed. In fact,
Wisconsin attorneys concerned about practice under the Act
have turned to the tracing rules of community property jurisdic-
tions.151 Those rules, while complex, are at least well known.
15 2 It
is likely that courts in many states adopting the UMPA will at
least look to the case law on tracing in the community property
states when developing their own rules. Indeed, they will have
the opportunity to pick and choose from among those rules as
they attempt to achieve the policies of the Act.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Uniform Marital Property Act will bring the commu-
nity property principle of equal sharing during marriage to
adopting common-law states. Classification of property as mari-
tal, individual, or other property will be the starting point for
most problems involving the property of spouses under the Act.
Title to property will no longer exclusively determine legal own-
ership. Instead, the time of acquisition and the source of the
property will determine its classification. Divorce litigants use a
similar process in many states to determine what property is
available for division, but the common-law states presently have
no procedure analogous to classification during marriage.
Every major change in the law has its costs. The necessity of
classification of property is one of the costs of the Uniform Mar-
ital Property Act. Since it is probably not possible to calculate
the costs, in monetary terms, of adopting the marital property
system, legislators considering the Act will be faced with the di-
lemma of whether the common-law system, which does not rec-
ognize the value of a spouse's unpaid work or the principle of
sharing during marriage, is so unfair that the state should adopt
151. See, e.g., MARITAL PROPERTY LAW IN WISCONSIN, supra note 3, at 3-8 to -17.
152. See, e.g., Bell, The Evolution of the Community-Out-First Presumption: A
Matter of Trust, 24 S. TEx. L.J. 191 (1981); Bruch, The Definition and Division of Mari-
tal Property in California: Towards Parity and Simplicity, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 769, 782-84;
Comment, The Commingling of Separate and Community Funds: The Requirement of
Tracing in Texas, 6 ST. MARY'S L.J. 234 (1974); Comment, Community Property: Com-
mingled Accounts and the Family-Expense Presumption, 19 STAN. L. REv. 661 (1967);
Comment, Community Property: The Concept of Tracing Ownership, 8 Tsx. TECH L.
REv. 637 (1977); Comment, supra note 149; Note, Community Property: Characterizing
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a system of community property. Are the incalculable costs of
converting from the common law to a community property sys-
tem outweighed by the perceived unfairness of the present sys-
tem? Before enacting the Uniform Marital Property Act, states
should study the Act carefully and examine the effects of its en-
actment in Wisconsin, the only state that has thus far adopted
it.
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